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Abstract 
The existing tax policies towards gasoline and diesel cars in European countries provide 
a  unique opportunity to analyze quality-based price discrimination and the implied 
tax incidence.  We develop an econometric framework for  the demand and pricing of 
gasoline and diesel cars.  Consumers choose the type of engine based on their annual 
mileage;  prices  are set  by the manufacturers.  Our empirical results show that the 
relative pricing of gasoline and diesel cars is  consistent with price discrimination of 
a monopolistic type, effectively segmenting low mileage from high mileage consumers. 
On average, about 75 to 90 percent of the price differentials between gasoline and diesel 
cars can be explained by markup differences.  The implied tax incidence is especially 
based on fuel taxes and less so on annual car taxes.  Implications for the effectiveness 
of tax policy are drawn. 
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Price discrimination based on willingness to pay for quality has been studied extensively in 
the theoretical literature. Mussa and Rosen (1978) show how a monopolist can extract higher 
profit margins from consumers with a higher willingness to pay for quality by offering a wide 
product line of price-quality combinations. When several firms compete, the feasibility and 
the nature of quality-based price discrimination is less well understood.  It depends on the 
precise pattern of competitive interaction, and no general results are available.  1  At the same 
time, efforts to quantify the empirical importance of price discriminating practices have been 
limited.  The problem is,  of course, that observed price differentials between high and low 
quality variants may stem from either cost or markup differences. 
In the European car market  a  unique opportunity is  available  to empirically  analyze 
quality-based price discrimination.  In most  European countries,  cars  are sold under two 
types of engine:  the gasoline and the diesel engine.  The diesel engine has a higher "quality" 
in the sense that it consumes less  fuel  per mile  and requires less  expensive fuel  due to a 
favorable tax treatment.  Consumers differ in their willingnes to pay for  this quality aspect 
since they are heterogeneous in their annual mileage.  As a result, manufacturers may consider 
a price discriminating strategy by charging different profit markups on the gasoline and the 
diesel variants to exploit the consumer mileage heterogeneity. 
We develop an econometric model of demand and pricing for gasoline and diesel cars.  The 
demand estimates show that the heterogeneity in the consumers' annual mileage is central 
in explaining the gasoline/diesel market shares.  In particular, the demand model predicts 
average mileages for gasoline and diesel consumers that are consistent with prior information. 
The pricing model decomposes the observed price differentials between gasoline and diesel 
18ee,  for  example, the specific  assumptions on  brand preferences used in Katz (1984)  to model prod-
uct differentiation and competitive interaction.  Gilbert and Matutes (1993)  use a different model of brand 
preferences, and find, surprisingly, that competition eliminates the feasibility of quality-based price discrim-
ination. The theoretical difficulties in analyzing quality-based price discrimination with competing firms are 
more generally present in screening models of second-degree price discrimination, see Armstrong and Vickers 
(2001). 
1 cars into their cost and markup components.  The estimates demonstrate that the price 
differentials are best explained by price discrimination of a monopolistic type.  On average, 
about 75 to 90 percent of the price premium to be paid for  a diesel car can be attributed 
to price discrimination between high and low mileage consumers; the remaining part follows 
from higher costs due to differences in specifications.  These results empirically demonstrate 
the feasibility and the importance of quality-based price discrimination in the presence of 
competition.  The results have important implications for  the effectiveness of fuel tax and 
car tax policy.  For example, the estimated demand effect of an increase in the diesel fuel tax 
is reduced by 50 percent if  one properly accounts for the manufacturers' pricing responses to 
tax changes. The results also imply that raising diesel fuel or car taxes would unambiguously 
increase tax revenues, whereas the revenue effects of raising gasoline taxes are mixed. 
As noted above, there exists very little econometric evidence on quality-based price dis-
crimination.  Shepard {1991}  exploits a  natural experiment in which firms  differ  in their 
ability to price discriminate, but presumably not (much) in their cost of production.  Ob-
served differences between firms in price differentials may then be attributed to markups, i.e. 
price discrimination.2  Unlike Shepard's application, we have no prior information on costs. 
We instead infer the presence of price discrimination from the structural model of conduct 
that is found to best fit the data.  Leslie (1999) considers various types price discrimination 
for  a  Broadway play,  including price discrimination based on different seat qualities.  He 
starts by estimating the demand system, and computes the prices as predicted by the cur-
rent industry circumstances.  He then investigates how prices would change if the fum had 
more flexibility in setting the price menu.3 
2In particular, Shepard (1991) considers price differentials between full-service and self-service at gasoline 
stations. She compares these differentials between stations offering both types and stations offering only one 
type of service.  Assuming that there is no difference in the cost of offering these services combined rather 
than separately, one may attribute higher price differentials at multi-service stations to price discrimination. 
Cohen (2001) adopts similar types of reduced form tests in the market for paper towels. 
3Metrick and Zeckhauser  (1996)  also consider the relationship between prices and quality (as well as 
quantity), in a theoretical and empirical analysis. In their application, different firms sell different qualities, 
and the question is whether prices will differ between these differentiated firms (or whether instead sales will 
2 Research on demand and pricing in the automobile market has received  considerable 
attention in recent years.  Most contributions ignore the issue  of quality-based price dis-
crimination by limiting attention to base model cars.  The focus  is instead on the nature 
of product differentiation and competition between different car models.  See the contribu-
tions by Bresnahan (1981,  1987),  Berry,  Levinsohn and Pakes  (1995,  1999),  Feenstra and 
Levinsohn (1995), Goldberg (1995),  and Petrin (1999) for the U.S. market.4  Regarding the 
European car market, Verb oven  (1996)  and Goldberg and Verb oven (2001)  have provided 
evidence of international price discrimination.  This is  price discrimination of the third de-
gree, and is achieved by the manufacturers' strategies to prevent cross-border consumer (or 
parallel importer) trade.  The present paper may be seen as  reinforcing the evidence that 
firms in a seemingly competitive market succeed in price discrimination strategies, also of 
the second degree type, by profitably segmenting consumers with a low annual mileage from 
those with a high annual mileage. 
There exists very detailed econometric evidence on price elasticities of demand for fuel. 
Goodwin (1992) and Oum, Waters and Yong (1992) provide a survey of this literature. The 
considerable amount of empirical research can be explained by the strong interest from a 
public policy taxation perspective.  A distinction is usually made between short-term and 
long-term fuel price elasticities.  Short-term elasticities measure fuel demand effects keeping 
the vehicle stock fixed;  long-term elasticities take into account changes in the size and the 
structure of the vehicle stock in response to fuel  price changes.5  A robust finding is that 
differ).  In our paper, the same firm offers different qualities (gasoline versus diesel), a central question being 
whether that firm can use its different qualities to price discriminate. 
4Among these product differentiation studies,  Bresnahan  (1987),  Feenstra and Levinsohn  (1995)  and 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) consider the nature of competition. 
5The long-term changes in the size and structure of the vehicle stock may follow from both changed car 
purchasing decisions and from new model introductions.  Pakes et al.  (1993)  provide convincing evidence 
(partly based on patent data for combustion engines) that companies in the U.S. started to develop more fuel 
efficient cars in response to the rise in fuel prices in 1973; the development of reliable diesel cars in Europe 
during the 70s and 80s has also been a response to fuel prices,  as seen below.  In our econometric analysis 
we nevertheless take the product characteristics as given.  The long term elasticities then essentially differ 
from the short term elasticities because of changed car purchasing decisions, in particular the substitution 
3 the long-term fuel price elasticities are substantially higher than the short-term elasticities. 
The results of the present paper imply that the long-term fuel  price elasticities  may be 
considerably overestimated (with a factor of more than 2) if  one does not properly account 
for the observed tax incidence by the car manufacturers in response to fuel price changes.  6 
The outline of the paper is as follows.  The next section describes the market for gasoline 
and diesel cars in three European countries:  Belgium, France and Italy.  Section 3 intro-
duces the econometric model of gasoline/diesel demand and pricing.  Section 4 presents the 
empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
2  The market for gasoline and diesel cars in Europe 
The vast majority of automobile engines in Europe are fuelled with either gasoline or diesel 
petroleum.7  Automobiles with a diesel engine quickly gained popularity in Europe during 
the seventies, stimulated by a favourable tax treatment and the subsequent technological 
improvements. In recent years, the choice between a gasoline or a diesel car has become one 
of the key elements in the European consumer's car purchasing decision. 
To introduce the questions we address in this paper, we have a first look at the technology, 
taxation, pricing and demand.  This discussion will be based on the data set we  collected 
for  three European countries, which is summarized in Table 1A and lB. The data consist 
of sales, list prices, taxes and technical characteristics of 41  pairs of automobile models in 
Belgium, France and Italy during 1991-1994.  These data are supplemented with information 
on the distribution of annual car mileage.8  The included models are the base models from 
to diesel engines with a lower cost per mile. 
6Issues of tax incidence are also present in Fershtman, Gandal and Markovich' (1998) empirical study of 
the Israeli car market, with an instructive policy simulation analysis of alternative taxes.  They only consider 
car taxes, and do not look at taxes in related complementary markets, such as fuel taxes.  Furthermore, their 
empirical estimates do not establish that firms indeed take into account taxes in their pricing strategies; the 
extent of tax incidence is driven by their assumption of Bertrand pricing behavior. 
7There is a third possible fuel:  liquid patrol gas (LPG). However, the market share of automobiles with 
an LPG engine is quite small, and in fact negligable in the three European countries that we study in detail. 
BData on list prices  (including value added taxes)  and technical characteristics come from the follow-
4 the ga.soline and the diesel range.  In ca.ses where the ba.se model of a ga.soline variant wa.s 
equipped with a  different  set  of options than the diesel variant  (e.g.  air conditioner or 
ABS), we  appropriately upgraded or downgraded the variants such that they contain the 
same equipment.9  Table IA shows summary statistics for the separate ga.soline  and diesel 
variables.  Table IB shows more detailed summary statistics for the differences between the 
diesel and ga.soline variables, which are the actual variables entering in the empirical model. 
The "between" standard deviation mea.sures the standard deviation due to variation across 
models,  wherea.s  the "within"  standard deviation is  a  measure of the variation across the 
three countries.  The standard deviations show that the technical characteristics especially 
show variation across models;  the tax variables  (fuel  and car tax) mainly show variation 
across countries; and the initial purcha.se price and sales variables show important variation 
over both dimensions. 
Technology 
In a ga.soline engine, a mixture of air and fuel is ignited by a spark; in a diesel engine, 
the mixture explodes spontaneously due to the high pressure.  These technical differences 
lie  at the basis of some well-known  differences  in performance and comfort.  The diesel 
engine traditionally produced lower horsepower (at equal engine size), and lower speed and 
acceleration than the ga.soline  engine.  Furthermore, the diesel  engine ha.s  a  reputation of 
making more noise and of a less  reliable start under cold temperatures.  On the positive 
side,  a  diesel engine generally ha.s  a  greater fuel  efficiency yielding  a greater  "autonomy" 
(the number of miles that can be driven with a full tank). Diesel engines also have a longer 
durability than their ga.soline counterparts. 
ing weekly retail catalogues (August issue)  De Autogids (Belgium), l'Automobile Magazine (France),  Quat-
troruote (Italy). Sales data come from publications on new car registrations by the Nationaal Jnstituut voor 
Statistiek (Belgium), l'Aryus de  l'Automobile et Locomotions (France) and A.C.1.  (Italy).  Average annual 
gasoline and diesel fuel prices, for all three countries, are taken from l'Aryus de l'Automobile et Locomotions. 
Data on the distribution of mileage, by several principle characteristics, come from the industry associations, 
A.C.E.A., F.E.B.I.A.C. and from survey data by De Borger (1987)  and C.B.S. 
9HelpfuJ and competent research assistance in this tedious data collection process was provided by Sandy 
Torrekens. 
5 Due to technological improvements  (such as the introduction of the turbo and direct 
injection), these differences have diminished in recent years.  Manufacturers in fact ::;pend 
significant efforts to offer closely comparable ''twin models":  for each model, they typically 
offer  about 4  to 6 different  versions  of gasoline  engines,  and a  similar  number of diesel 
engines.  The averages in Table lA and IB give an idea of the current differences in technical 
characteristics. The lower engine power of diesel cars (horsepower, speed, acceleration time) 
is compensated by the higher engine capacity (displacement) and a higher weight (partly due 
to a stronger insulation against the diesel noise).  Greater diesel fuel efficiency is re:8.ected in 
the lower amount of liter consumed per 100 km. 
Taxation 
It is  hard to overstate the importance of taxes on automobiles in Europe.  In France 
and Belgium, automobile-related tax revenues respectively amounted to about 800 and 1000 
dollars per capita in 1997.10  In other European countries, similar amounts apply.  The most 
important taxes are value added taxes on the purchase of a (new or second-hand) car, annual 
car taxes, and excise taxes on fuel.  The annual car taxes and the fuel taxes have been designed 
to follow  a discriminatory policy. towards. gasoline and diesel cars.  Furthermore, different 
countries typically adopted different policies.  Table 2 illustrates this for the countries of our 
data set. The first three rows present the average annual fuel costs, i.e.  price per liter times 
liters per mile times annual mileage for the average driver.  These fuel costs consist of about 
70% excise taxes.  In all three countries, the average person driving a gasoline car spends 
about 1100 dollars per year on fuel.  In Belgium and Italy, about 400 dollars per year can be 
saved on fuel from driving a diesel car; in France, the average savings are even 500 dollars 
per year.  The next three rows on Table 2 present the annual car taxes, which are based on 
the fiscal horsepower assigned to a car. In France, the annual car taxes also favor diesel cars. 
In Belgium but especially in Italy,  the annual car taxes on diesel cars are higher than on 
gasoline cars.  In Italy, the higher annual car taxes even outweigh the savings in fuel  costs 
from driving a diesel, at least for the average Italian driver. 
The policy reasons behind the differential tax treatment towards gasoline and diesel cars 
lOThese numbers are from CCFA and FEBIAC, the French and Belgian automobile associations. 
6 are not obvious.  According to the OECD (1993, p.  210), the favorable tax treatment on the 
diesel fuel  "is intended to avoid disabling freight transport, but governments also see some 
value in the introduction of diesel cars". For example, the OECD attributes the particularly 
favorable  attitude towards diesel  cars in France to the strength of French manufacturers 
in exporting diesel  cars  and supplying engines  to other manufacturers;  it also  reflects  a 
more general concern in French energy policy to minimize oil dependence (since diesel cars 
consume less).  From an environmental perspective, the favorable diesel tax treatment does 
not seem justified.  As  discussed for  example in Michaelis (1995),  the diesel engine emits 
less carbon monoxide than the (unleaded) gasoline engine, roughly the same volatile organic 
compounds, and more NOx •  In addition, it emits airborne particulates unlike the gasoline 
engine.  The net result of these different emissions is  that diesel  cars are not clearly less 
damaging from an environmental (e.g.  global warming) point of view, whereas they do have 
some clear disadvantages from the point of view of urban air quality (Crawford and Smith, 
1995).  From an economic point of view, a favorable diesel tax treatment may be defended by 
Diamond and Mirrlees' (1971) rule that intermediate goods (i.e.  the transportation sector) 
should not be subject to revenue-raising taxes.  However, such a reasoning no longer seems 
valid in current times, since the boundary between the diesel and gasoline fuel  no longer 
closely corresponds to the boundary between intermediate goods  (truck)  and final  goods 
(  cars) consumptionY 
Demand 
Whatever the motives behind the discriminatory tax practices, a comparison across the 
three countries suggests that consumers have taken the taxes into account in their car pur-
chasing decisions.  This can be seen from the "dieselization rate" , i.e.  the percentage of diesel 
cars in the total car sales, as shown in Table 2.  In Belgium and especially in France, where 
diesel cars have a very favorable tax treatment, the dieselization rate is high. In Italy, where 
llThis used to be different one decade ago, when most diesel usage originated from truck traffic, as is still 
the case in the U.S. market.  Note also that one could in principle implement Diamond and Mirrlees rule in 
an alternative way,  by allowing tax deductions for  fuel or car usage to business users.  This is the case in 
several countries. 
7 the annual fuel cost savings must be balanced against a significantly higher annual diesel car 
tax, the dieselization rate only reaches 15 percent. 
The consumer's annual mileage is a main driving factor in her gasoline/diesel car purchas-
ing decision.  Most European car magazines carefully guide their customers by periodically 
publishing detailed tables to compare the cost of gasoline and diesel cars under alternative 
mileage scenario's.12 More recently, internet websites allow consumers to compute their costs 
for gasoline and diesel cars by entering their expected mileage.  The importance of the con-
sumer's annual mileage is reflected in the data. In Belgium, for example, the average annual 
mileage for  diesel car users amounts to 25000 km, compared to an annual mileage of only 
14300 km for gasoline car users.13 
Pricing 
To which extent have the firms taken the discriminatory tax policies into account in their 
pricing strategies?  The average price data in Table 2 provide a preliminary answer to this 
question.  In all three countries, diesel cars are more expensive than gasoline carS.14  The 
question is, of course, whether these higher prices are caused by higher (marginal) costs or 
by higher markups. The empirical model in the next sections aims to address this question. 
At this point, observe that the price premium for diesel cars is much higher in France than 
in Belgium and in Italy.  Given that the most favorable tax treatment for diesel cars is in 
France (and assuming that diesel cars are no more costly to sell in France than elsewhere), 
this indicates that price differentials between gasoline and diesel cars are at least partly 
driven by markups. 
Another way to verify whether the car prices reflect the tax policies is by considering a 
simple reduced. form regression.  Table 3 regresses the car price differential between diesel 
and gasoline cars on differences in observed technical characteristics and on the differences 
12For example, for a large set of cars consumer magazine Test-Achats (1995, ill. 373) even computed the 
critical mileages above which the diesel variant becomes more advantageous than the gasoline variant. 
138ee De Borger (1987).  A Figure reported by Transport Research Laboratory (1995) indicates comparable 
mileage differences between gasoline and diesel cars for most European countries. 
14This remains true after adjusting for  differences in observed quality.  This was verified in a  hedonic 
regression from which quality-adjusted price differences may be computed. 
8 in average annual fuel  cost and car tax differentials. IS  In the first specification (column 1) 
the fuel  cost and annual car tax differential enter linearly.  The estimates show that a firm 
raises the price premium for  a diesel car by 6.34$ in response to an additional annual fuel 
cost saving of 1$ from purchasing of a diesel car. Firms do not appear to significantly change 
their diesel price premium in response to a change in the annual car tax difference.  In the 
second specification (column 2 of Table 3)  the square of fuel  cost and annual car tax also 
enter, to allow for a nonlinear relationship. Additional annual fuel cost savings on diesel cars 
again lead to higher diesel price premia, though the effect is declining; at an average annual 
fuel cost saving of 456$, a firm would raise the diesel price premium by 10.17$ in response 
to an additional annual fuel cost saving by 1$.  A decrease in the annual car tax difference 
would lead to an increase in the diesel price premium by 3.09$ at a zero tax difference, but 
only to an insignificant 1.92$  increase evaluate at the average car tax difference  of 112$. 
Overall, these regressions suggest that firms substantially adjust the diesel price premium in 
response to fuel cost differentials, but less so in response to car tax differentials. 
The above discussion gave some descriptive evidence on how tax policies may influence 
both consumer demand and manufacturer pricing behavior.  This is  now  formalized  in a 
model to explain price differentials,  and decompose them into marginal cost and markup 
differences. 
3  Consumer demand 
3.1  The model 
Consumers choose to purchase one particular car make j  coming with one of two engine 
variants k, where k = G, D refers to the gasoline or the diesel engine.  The utility derived 
from purchasing one particular make/engine variant takes the following simple form 
15These regressions resemble standard  "hedonic regressions",  except that now  prices  are expressed in 
differences between diesel and gasoline cars, hence the lower R2.  The regressions should only be interpreted 
as prelinlinary evidence, since they contain a mixture of both suply side and demand side considerations. 
9 Ujk =  Z +  ajk +  Vj, 
where ajk is the mean intrinsic utility from purchasing make j  with engine k,  common to 
all consumers;  Vj is  an individual-specific random component around that mean;  and z is 
the consumption of goods other than car services.  Both the mean utility term ajk and the 
individual-specific term Vj may depend on observable characteristics such as performance, 
size  and safety.  The term Vj  is  often modelled  as  an LLd.  random variable  (as  in  the 
logit model), implying no correlation of consumer preferences across cars.  Advances in the 
discrete choice literature, most notably by Berry (1994)  and Berry,  Levinsohn and Pakes 
(1995), show how to relax this unrealistic assumption and allow consumer preferences to be 
correlated across cars with similar characteristics. Their random coefficients specification of 
Vj yields a flexible  aggregate model of product differentiation,  with plausible substitution 
patterns between different cars.  For recent applications see,  for example, Nevo  (2001)  and 
Petrin (1999).  As shown below,  in our application no specific structure is imposed on Vj. 
We focus instead on the choice of engine, conditional on the car choice. 
Consumers have  an annual income  y  to be spent on  car services and other goods  z. 
Annual expenditures on car services include the following three terms: an annualized initial 
purchase price, annual car taxes and annual fuel expenditures. 
(i)  The purchase price of a car is Pjk.  This is  written in annualized terms as 
P'Pjk, where p is an annualization coefficient, depending on the consumer's rate of 
time preference (or implicit interest rate) and the expected vehicle life.I6  When 
consumers have a  high implicit interest rate or when the expected vehicle life 
is low,  p is  close  to one and the purchase price of a car is quickly discounted. 
Conversely, when consumers have a low implicit interest rate, p is close to zero. 
16Following  Hausman  (1978),  one  may  define  the  annualization  coefficient  88  p  =  (rl(l + 
r) (1- (1 + r)-Tr\ where r is the rate of time preference  (implicit  interest rate) and T  is the vehicle 
life.  From the estimate of p and information on T one can then infer the implicit interest rate r. 
10 (ii)  In addition to the annualized purchase price P'Pjk, the consumers also need 
to pay an annual car tax of Tjk.  This tax may differ across makes and variants, 
and is usually based on the "fiscal horsepower"  of a car.  The fiscal horsepower 
is  computed from characteristics such as horsepower,  displacement and weight 
according to a formula defined by the government. 
(iii) Finally, consumers incur annual fuel expenditures. These depend on the fuel 
price qk for  fuel  k  (i.e.  gasoline or diesel  fuel,  in dollars per liter), on the fuel 
efficiency Wjk (in liters per 100 kilometer), and on the annual mileage (J.  Annual 
fuel expenditures per mile  are 'lrjk  =  qkWjk.  The annual mileage  (J  is  a random 
variable which may vary from  consumer to consumer.  For  simplicity,  assume 
that annual mileage is  not sensitive to fuel prices (inelastic demand), so that a 
consumer's total annual fuel expenditures equal 'lrjk(J.17 
In sum, when purchasing a particular make j  with engine k,  total annual expenditures 
on car services are given by PPjk +  Tjk +  'lrjk(J.  The remaining income y - P'Pjk - Tjk - 'lrjk(J is 
left for the consumption on other goods z (at a price normalized to 1).  We can then write a 
consumer's indirect utility from purchasing a make j  with engine k as 
(1) 
Given this indirect utility function, consumers can choose their most preferred make and 
engine variant.  For our purposes it is sufficient to focus on the consumer's choice of engine 
variant k  conditional on purchasing a particular make j.  This choice crucially depends on 
the consumer's annual mileage  (J.  A consumer is indifferent between buying make j  with 
a gasoline engine G and with a diesel engine D if UjG =  UjD, hence if her annual mileage 
equals 
(2) 
17Previous studies have estimated quite low "short-term" elasticities of gasoline demand, varying from 0 
to arOlmd -.2. See for example Goldberg (1998)  for a discussion. 
11 where the D.Xj denotes the difference between a diesel and a gasoline variable,  i.e.  D.Xj  == 
XjD - XjG.  Consumers driving 0 < OJ  prefer the gasoline engine of jj other consumers prefer 
the diesel engine of j.  One can then compute the probability that the gasoline variant is 
chosen,  conditional upon buying j, and equate this to the observed market share of the 
gasoline variant of j  in the total sales of j, sGlj, i.e. 
SGlj  =  Pr(O < OJ  I  j) =  Fj(Oj),  (3) 
where Fje->  is the conditional cumulative distribution function of 0,  i.e.  conditional on the 
choice of car j. This distribution may differ across car makes j. For example, it is empirically 
observed that consumers who decide to purchase larger cars also tend to drive more miles 
per year. Since the cumulative distribution function Fj (·) is a monotone increasing function, 
we can invert (3) such that OJ  =  Jij-l(sGlj).  Rearrange this using (2)  to obtain: 
(4) 
where Fj- 1 (.) is a monotone function defined as the inverse of Fj (.  ). Equation (4) is the trans-
formed conditional demand equation.  Before discussing its empirical specification, several 
remarks are in order. 
First, note that the random variable Vj does not appear in (4).  In this sense our approach 
is distinct from the work of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and the subsequent literature. 
They focus on understanding the pattern of product differentiation between different cars, 
by explicitly modelling Vj  in a random coefficients framework.  Our approach abstracts from 
the product differentiation aspects between cars, and instead focuses on understanding the 
choice of the engine variant, conditional on the choice of a car make, without specifying the 
distribution of Vj .18 
1SIt is also instructive to make a comparison with Bresnahan (1981,  1987), who made early contributions 
to measuring product differentiation and market power.  He formulated a model of one-dimensional vertical 
product differentiation (with quality proxied by a combination of horsepower, car size, etc  ... ).  In  our empirical 
model, there is  also a single quality dimension (namely fuel expenditures per mile).  However, Bresnahan's 
one-dirnensional vertical differentiation model is  used to describe product differentiation between different 
12 Second, note that annual mileage is the only source of consumer heterogeneity affecting 
the conditional gasoline-diesel choice.  The consumers' annual mileage ma!;ters  since it is 
interacted with the fuel expenditures per mile 7rjk associated with engine variant k  of car 
j.  In practice,  consumers may also  be heterogeneous in their valuation of other engine 
characteristics, such as horsepower.  To account for such heterogeneity, one could specify an 
unconditional market share equation,  and obtain identification of the random coefficients 
as in Berry,  Levinsohn and Pakes  (1995).  Instead, we  chose to start with the conditional 
market share equation and account for annual mileage as the main source of heterogeneity.  To 
obtain an idea of the plausibility of this specification, we will compute the average mileages 
of gasoline and diesel consumers as predicted by the estimates, and confront these with the 
available prior evidence on annual gasoline and diesel mileage.  If annual mileage is indeed 
the most important source of consumer heterogeneity affecting the gasoline-diesel choice, one 
can expect the predicted mileages for gasoline users to be substantially below the predicted 
mileages for diesel users, in line with the actually observed mileages.  In contrast, if  there are 
important other sources of heterogeneity, one may expect the actual mileages for  gasoline 
and diesel users to be closer to each other than predicted by the demand model. 
3.2  Specification 
To estimate the demand, we  use product-level data on aggregate sales, prices and charac-
teristics, plus data on the mileage distribution.  To complete the demand specification, we 
need to specify Fj-10 and f1aj in (4).  First consider Fj-l(.).  Since Fj-10 is the inverse of 
the cumulative distribution function of mileage,  one can interpret Fj-l(SGIi)  as a  threshold 
mileage,  i.e.  the mileage that is not reached during one year by a  given proportion sGlj 
of consumers purchasing j.  In principle, this information can be obtained from consumer 
survey tables containing, for  each make, one colUlnn with annual mileage categories and a 
second column with the proportion of cars corresponding to each mileage category; there 
is  thus no need for  making parametric assumptions on the distribution function of B.  In 
cars.  In contrast, our model only describes differentiation between different engine variants, given the car 
choice (while diHerentiation across cars is allowed to be more general). 
13 practice, we do not have such a detailed information on mileage distribution at our disposal 
for the three countries.  We therefore specify the cumulative distribution function of 0,  and 
its corresponding inverse, parametrically as a parsimonious function of two parameters, the 
mean annual mileage J-tj  and the standard deviation aj, for which we have prior information 
by several principal characteristics of the car makes, such as horsepower and weight.  Given 
our parametric approach it is important to examine the robustness of our results with re-
spect to various alternative distribution functions.  We considered three different functional 
forms:  the double exponential (which resembles the bell shape of the normal distribution), a 
two-parameter exponential (which is a skewed distribution function) and the uniform.  The 
results are essentially robust with respect to these alternative specifcations.  We report here 
only the results using the double exponential distribution.  Applying (3), the market share 
equation Salj = Fj(Oj) is then given: 
Salj  =  exp ( - exp ( - (OJ  - J-tj)  ~aj  - 'Y) )  (5) 
where 1f  ~  3.14 and 'Y  ~ .577 is  Euler's constant.  It is  straightforward to rearrange this 
equation to obtain a solution for  OJ  =  F;l(salj). This solution can then be substituted into 
the trarlSformed demand equation (4). 
Now consider f:!..aj.  Recall that f:!..aj  captures the difference in the mean intrinsic utility 
from purchasing make j  with a diesel engine (ajD)  or with a gasoline engine (aja).  Note 
that the variables measuring size and safety are common to the gasoline and diesel variants 
of a  make j, so that they do  not enter f:!..aj.  Hence only the performance variables, such 
as horsepower, displacement, speed and acceleration, enter f:!..aj.  More precisely, we specify 
f:!..aj  as follows: 
(6) 
where f:!..P ERFj  captures differences in observed performance variables, for example differ-
ences in horsepower.  The constant ao can be interpreted as the mean extra utility from  a 
diesel variant, possibly negative. It  captures specific diesel features that are not measured by 
the performance variables in f:!..PERFj , such as discomfort from noise, unreliability or longer 
14 durability.  Finally, the term Cj is a mean zero Li.d.  error term.  It captures diesel features 
specific to make j  that influence utility, but that are unobserved by the econometrkian. For 
example, it is possible that a Renault 19 has a diesel engine with an above average reliability, 
whereas Volkswagen Polo has one below average. 
To summarize, substituting the expression for  f::!..aj,  (6),  in equation (4), we  obtain the 
following demand specification that can be taken to the data: 
(7) 
where Fj-1(sG!j) can be computed from inverting the distribution function given by (5).  The 
parameters to be estimated are O!o,  O!l  and p.  The required data are sales, prices, technical 
characteristics, and the mileage distribution across consumers. 
4  Pricing 
Because of our interest in the implications for  price discrimination and tax incidence, we 
also specify two stylized models of pricing.  As in the specification of the demand side, we 
are not interested in a complete analysis of pricing.  Instead, we  focus  on explaining price 
differentials between diesel and gasoline cars.  Generally speaking, the price differential f::!..pj 
can be decomposed in a marginal cost difference f::!..Cj  and a markup difference f::!..mj,  i.e.: 
A first model states that there are no markup differences, f::!..mj  =  o.  The price differential 
between diesel and gasoline cars is then entirely driven by differences in the marginal cost of 
producing diesel and gasoline cars.  A purely cost-driven explanation for price differentials 
would obviously obtain under perfect competition.  However,  price differentials will also be 
cost-driven under imperfect competition if firms charge the same markup for their gasoline 
and diesel cars.  Several theoretical models of oligopoly pricing in fact yield zero markup 
differences between high and low  quality products of the same firm,  see e.g.  Gilbert and 
15 Matutes (1993)  and Armstrong and Vickers (2001).19 
An alternative model states that the markup differences between diesel and gasoline cars 
are equal to the premium charged under monopoly market power.  Specifically, consider a 
monopolist for car j, setting the price of its diesel variant PjD  to maximize the sum of its 
gasoline and diesel profits, given that consumers do not substitute to other cars: 
(pjG - CjG) sGlj + (pjD - CjD) (1- SGIi), 
where sGlj = Fj (OJ)  is the conditional market share equation as given by (3).  The optimal 
price PjD  satisfies the first-order condition: 
- «pjG - CjG) - (pjD - CjD)) /j(O;) frr. + 1 - Fj (l/;) =  0, 
J 
where 1;0 is the density function of Jij(.).  This can be rewritten as: 
1-Fj(l/j)  -tl:Trj 
!:lPj = !:lCj +  1;(0j)  (-p-). 
A  monopoly price surcharge for  a  diesel  car would  naturally result if the firms  have 
local monopoly power for each make j.20  Yet note that to obtain the above expression for 
price differentials it is sufficient to assume that the prices of the diesel variants, PjD, are set 
monopolistically.  This thus allows for  the possibility that the price levels of base gasoline 
variants are set quite competitively. 
Analogous to the specification of the mean utility difference between a gasoline and a 
diesel car, !:laj, we specify the marginal cost difference !:lCj  as follows: 
(8) 
19Gilbert and Matutes (1993)  show this in an oligopoly with two price setting firms,  each fum selling a 
high quality and a low quality variant of horizontally differentiated products. Armstrong and Vickers obtain 
a more general result in the context of nonlinear pricing (See their Proposition 5 of Armstrong and Vickers 
(2001». 
20Specify, for example, for each make j  the individual-specific taste parameter Vj to equal 0 for a fraction 
'Pj  of consumers,  and equal to -00 for  the rentaining fraction.  For  each  car make j  there is then local 
monopoly power over a fraction 'Pj  consumers. 
16 The same characteristics that influence the differences  in the mean utility may thus also 
affect differences in marginal costs. 
To summarize, we have two possible pricing specifications, which we will refer to below 
as our "competitive" and "monopolistic" pricing specifications: 
"competitive"  (9) 
"monopolistic" 
One should keep in mind that these terms only serve to label the pattern of observed price 
differentials between gasoline and diesel variants. They do not necessarily refer to the man-
ufacturers' actual pricing behavior for  all prices in the market. 
5  Identification and estimation 
In the empirical analysis we begin by estimating the demand equation (7) separately, with-
out imposing any structure on pricing behavior.  Next,  we  estimate the demand equation 
(7) jointly with the pricing equation (9).  Whether or not one estimates the equations simul-
taneously, it is important account for the fact that sGlj and !::J.Pj  are endogenous variables, 
simultaneously determined by consumer demand and manufacturer pricing.  Consequently, 
one may expect these variables to be correlated to the error terms  ~j and 'f/j,  which cap-
ture the unobserved diesel features of model j, influencing utility and marginal cost.  For 
example, a  diesel  variant of a  car j  with a  particularly high unobserved diesel quality  ~j 
will have a  high market share,  but at the same time the manufacturers will  presumably 
charge a  high price.  The result is  a  positive correlation between  /:).Pj  and  ~j.  A  simple 
ordinary least squares estimator would therefore be inconsistent; in particular, p would be 
biased towards zero.  Consequently, instrumental variables should be used to obtain consis-
tent parameter estimates.  More specifically, we  adopt Hansen's (1982)  generalized method 
of moments (GMM). This estimator can be used for estimating a single equation or a simul-
taneous system with possibly correlated error terms ~j and 'f/j.  The estimator allows one to 
17 compute heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors that are robust with respect to serial 
cQrrelation. 
It remains to specify the set of instruments, which constitute the orthogonality conditions 
of the GMM estimator. The instruments should be exogenous variables, uncorrelated to the 
error term.  Our main identification assumption is that the nonprice characteristics of the 
cars, such as performance, fuel efficiency or taxes, qualify as such variables. This is a common 
assumption made in the empirical literature on oligopoly models with product differentiation. 
The usual justification for this assumption is that these are variables that can only be slowly 
adjusted, so that they may be viewed as  predetermined at the pricing stage.  The typical 
difficulty in adopting this approach is that these variables may enter both the demand and 
supply  (cost)  side,  so that there may not be a  sufficient  number of instruments for  the 
number of parameters to be estimated. Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) 
discuss this problem and propose to use (functions of) the characteristics of the competitors 
as additional instruments. In our application, the parameter restrictions that are implicit in 
specification (7) provide another answer to the suitable choice of instruments. In particular, 
the variables l::..1rj and l::..7j can be used as instruments for l::..Pj.  Identification follows from the 
fact that fuel costs and taxes are monetary variables that influence the consumers' budget 
constraint (and indirect utility) in the same manner as prices, for  which they instrument. 
In sum, using l::..PERFj, tl.7rj  and l::..7j,  we have one more instrument than the number of 
parameters to be estimated. 
6  The empirical results 
As described in more detail in section 2, our data set contains sales, list prices and techni-
cal characteristics of 41  pairs of automobile models in three European countries, Belgium, 
France and Italy,  during 1991-1994,  plus data on the distribution of mileage across  con-
sumers.  In the discussion below the subscript j  should now be viewed as indexing the car 
make, country and year (instead of only the car make).  To estimate (7)  and (9), we  need 
to specify the technical characteristics entering in l::..PERFj. We have data on the following 
18 performance variables:  horsepower,  displacement, weight,  speed and acceleration.  We  ex-
perimented with several alternative specifications. The empirical results presented in Tables 
4 to 6 are based on a specification including the horsepower, displacement, and weight.  The 
parameter estimates, and the implications for the decomposition of price differentials into 
cost and markup differences,  and for tax incidence, were robust when other characteristics 
were included.  For example, we considered a specification with the horsepower/weight ra-
tio and displacement as characteristics.  We also considered a specification in which speed 
and acceleration enter instead of horsepower and displacement; and a specification in which 
horsepower, displacement, weight, speed and acceleration all enter together. 
We impose some further structure on the error terms Cj and 'fJj  through fixed effects.  We 
include market dummies for  France and Italy to capture possible differences in tastes and 
costs, relative to the reference country Belgium. We cannot a priori rule out the possibility 
that French and Italian consumers have different tastes for  gasoline versus diesel cars than 
Belgian consumers.  Significant  cost  differences  across  markets,  in contrast,  seem  rather 
unlikely:  there is no reason to expect a systematically higher cost of selling a diesel car in 
the French market than in the Belgian or Italian market.  Insignificant estimates for  the 
market dummies on the cost side may thus be expected if the econometric model is  well 
specified.  We also  include source country dummies for  French,  German or Italian cars to 
capture taste and cost differences across source countries.  The reference is "other countries" , 
i.e.  Japan, Spain or the United Kingdom. 
6.1  Demand 
We start by estimating the demand equation separately.  Column 1 of Table 4 shows the 
results.  The parameters of the technical characteristics have  the expected positive sign; 
for displacement and weight they are significant.  Since diesel cars on average have a lower 
horsepower, but a higher weight and displacement than gasoline cars, it is interesting to look 
at the overall valuation differences implied by the estimates  (~aj). It turns out that ~aj 
is small on average, namely -291$ (written in capitalized terms), compared to an average 
purchase price differential of 2323$  (Table  IB). This confirms the discussion in section 2: 
19 firms are relatively succesful in offering ''twin'' gasoline and diesel cars, which are comparable 
in overdll performance even if the individual characteristics differ because of technological 
constraints. 
The price coefficient  (p)  is  estimated very  precisely at 0.121.  Recall that p may  be 
interpreted as an annualization coefficient,  reflecting the extent to which consumers take 
into account the purchase price of the car in their annual budget constraint.  Assuming a 
vehicle life of 11  years,  the consumers' implicit interest rate implied by the estimate of p 
is  about 11.5 percent.  This is  slightly above  (though not significantly different from)  the 
actual interest rates on the capital markets during the period 1991-1994.  For example, the 5 
year government bond interest rate varied between 7.5 and 10 percent, whereas the interest 
rates on installment loans specifically for purchasing cars varied between 9 and 11.7 percent 
in Belgium.  21  Consumers thus tend to solve their investment problem in a rather forward 
looking way:  they use interest rates close to the capital market rates when trading off the 
higher initial purchase price for  a diesel car against the future fuel cost savings.  22 
The demand intercept is estimated to be -325.9 and significant:  this says that Belgian 
consumers (the reference market) value diesel cars over 300 dollar less than a gasoline car, 
after controlling for the observed differences in characteristics; this may be due to, for  ex-
ample, discomfort from noise or lower reliability.  This negative diesel valuation is somewhat 
stronger in France (-50 dollar); in Italy, consumers seem to care less about diesel comfort 
per se (significant fixed effect of about +150 dollar).  The dummy variables for the source 
countries are all insignificant, implying that the French, German and Italian diesel brands 
do not have a significantly higher valuation than the brands from other origins. 
21This rate concerns a value of an installement loan of BEF 400000, or about $10000, with fixed monthly 
installments during 48 months (information provided by consumer magazine Test-Achats). 
22This is consistent with economic theory, but conHicts with some anomalies in the literature. For example, 
Hausman (1979) finds econometric evidence that consumers use too high interest rates when choosing among 
airconditioners.  Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) report experimental evidence on myopic consumer behavior. 
An explanation for the result that consumers use the "right"  implicit interest rate is that there are good 
financing possibilities for cars, and that the gasoline/diesel choice is a fairly clean investment problem, since 
every car typically offers both engine versions. 
20 What does the demand specification predict about the annual mileage driven by con-
sumers of gasoline and diesel cars?  An answer to this question can provide an idea of how 
well the demand model is specified.  As  discussed above,  if the sole source of heterogene-
ity regarding the gasoline/diesel decision is the consumers' annual mileage, then one would 
expect the average annual mileage of gasoline consumers to be considerably lower than the 
average annual mileage of diesel consumers. In contrast, if  there are other important sources 
of consumer heterogeneity,  uncorrelated with mileage,  then one would expect the average 
annual mileage. of gasoline and diesel consumers to be closer to each other than predicted by 
the demand specification. 
To address this question,  we  use data on the actual average  mileages,  distinguished 
by  gasoline  and diesel  consumers,  for  several  car categories  in the Belgian market.  We 
confront  these data with the average  mileages  as  predicted  by the model;  for  example, 
the predicted average mileage by gasoline consumers of car j  is  numerically computed by 
fe<e*  Bfj(B)dB/Fj(Bj).  Standard errors and 95  percent confidence intervals are computed 
- 3 
using a  parametric bootstrap procedure.  23  The results are shown in Table 5.  For both 
gasoline and diesel consumers, the predicted mileages show a pattern in line with the actual 
mileages.  For gasoline  consumers,  the mileages  vary between 13000 km and 16000  km, 
depending on the weight category of the car; for diesel consumers they vary between 21000 
km and 25000 km.  In 10 of the 12 cases, the actual gasoline or diesel mileages fall within the 
95 percent confidence interval associated with the predictions of the model (these cases are 
indicated by an asterix).  These findings are evidence that mileage heterogeneity is indeed a 
driving force in explaining the consumer gasoline/diesel demand. If  other factors would also 
be significant, then one would expect significant underpredictions for gasoline mileages and 
overpredictions for the diesel mileages.  Why is mileage heterogeneity in fact so important 
in the purchasing decision?  We  already provided institutional evidence in Section 2 that 
consumers are to a large extent guided by fuel  cost savings in their choice of engine type. 
23Specifically, we assume that the estimated parameters are the true means and that the estimated variance 
covariance matrix of the parameters is the true variance covariance matrix. We then take 2000 random draws 
of the parameters assuming a multivariate normal distribution. 
21 This is  in part the result of succesful new product developments, leading to the supply of 
a  range of closely comparable  "twin"  gasoline/diesel models.  Furthermore,  even if other 
characteristics, such as performance differences, play an important role, it is  possible that 
the consumers' idiosyncratic valuations for  these characteristics are correlated with their 
mileage. 
6.2  Pricing 
We next estimate the demand equation (7)  and the pricing equation (9) jointly.  A central 
question is whether the price differentials between gasoline and diesel cars are largely driven 
by cost differentials, or whether monopolistic price discrimination is important.  To distin-
guish between the two alternative pricing models in (9), we considered nonnested hypothesis 
tests.  More specifically, as in Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995) we use the instrumental vari-
able version of the P-test procedure proposed by McKinnon, White and Davidson (1983) in 
the context of instrumental variables.24  The P-test statistic compares pairs of models and 
asymptotically has a standard normal distribution, if the null hypothesis is correct.  The t-
statistic for the validity of the monopolistic model against the alternative competitive model 
equals 0.328,  well below the critical value (at a 95%  confidence level) of 1.96.  In contrast, 
the t-statistic for the validity of the competitive model against the monopolistic alternative 
is  large,  i.e.  6.672.  These test statistics tell us that the model of monopolistic markup 
differences cannot be rejected in favor  of the competitive model, while the reverse is clearly 
possible.  Recall from section 4 that one should not conclude that all prices are necessarily 
set monopolistically in the automobile market. The results relate only to the pattern of price 
differentials between gasoline and diesel cars. 
To gain a further understanding on the presence of monopolistic price discrimination, we 
also estimated the following equation: 
24The test applies to linear, single equation models.  We therefore apply the test on the pricing equation, 
which is linear, using the estimated value of p from the demand equation. 
22 jointly with the demand equation.  This equation nests the two forms  of pricing in (9)  as 
special cases through the parameter >...  The estimate of >.. is about 0.913, with a standard error 
of about 0.120.  This confirms that price differentials are much closer to (and insignificantly 
different from) monopolistic pricing than to competitive pricing. 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence in favor  of monopolistic price discrimination is 
provided by the obtained demand and cost parameter estimates under the alternative spec-
ifications.  Columns 2 and 3 show the parameter estimates under joint estimation of the 
demand and pricing specifications.  All  demand parameter estimates in the monopolistic 
specification (column 2)  are comparable to the ones obtained from estimating the demand 
equation separately (column 1).  This indicates that adding the monopolistic pricing speci-
fication does not seriously affect the demand side parameters.  In contrast, several demand 
parameters change substantially under the competitive specification.  This is for  example 
true for  the coefficient  on weight  and several market and source fixed  effects.  The most 
drastic change is the estimate of the annualization coefficient  p,  which doubles in size and 
has a very small standard error. 
The cost side  parameters are consistent with  a priori expections in the monopolistic 
specification, but not always in the competitive specification.  The technical characteristics 
positively and significantly affect marginal costs under the monopolistic specification; in the 
competitive specification, the sign of the horsepower parameter is negative (though insignif-
icant).  The market fixed effects show the most interesting differences.  In the monopolistic 
specification, the fixed effects for  the French and Italian market (relative to Belgium)  are 
insignificant, which implies that there are no significant cost differences across markets.  In 
contrast, in the competitive specification the market fixed effects do enter significantly, with a 
significantly positive and large fixed effect for France, and a significantly negative fixed effect 
for Italy.  This follows from the fact that the competitive specification imposes zero markup 
differences between gasoline and diesel cars; any systematic cross-country differences in the 
price surcharge for diesel cars must then be attributed exclusively to cost differences.  In the 
monopolistic specification, cross-country differences in the diesel surcharge may also be the 
result of markup differences.  If  one accepts the presumption that marginal cost differences 
23 between gasoline and diesel cars should not differ significantly across markets, these findings 
may be viewed as fJrther economic evidence in favor of monopolistic price differences. 
6.3  Explaining price differentials 
Table 6 uses the results from the preferred monopolistic specification in Table 4 (column 
2)  to decompose the observed price differences between gasoline and diesel cars into cost 
and markup differences.  In particular, for each make j, I compute the fraction of the price 
difference D.p; that is explained by the difference in markup. The first two columns of Table 6 
present the average fraction across makes and the standard deviation over the sample.  Since 
markups are a function of  the parameter estimates, the fractions are themselves estimates. To 
have an idea of the precision of this estimate, the third and fourth column show the estimated 
fraction for  a  representive make  (Le.  with average characteristics)  and its corresponding 
standard error.25 
The first part of Table 6 considers all car makes in the sample.  On average, the pricing 
model attributes about 84 percent of price differences to markup differences.  The standard 
deviation is relatively large, 47 percent, which shows that for specific cars the estimated frac-
tion may be much lower or higher.  For a representative make (with average characteristics) 
the fraction of the price difference that is explained by the markup difference is estimated 
r,,,,irly precisely at 61  percent. 
The second part of Table 6 splits up the samples by country.  This yields some interesting 
further insights.  Markup differences  especially contribute to price  differences  in France, 
and less so in Belgium and in Italy.  This follows  from the fact that France has the most 
favorable tax treatment of diesel cars (as discussed in detail in Section 2), thereby providing 
the strongest  incentives  for  price discrimination.  Notice  that the greater importance of 
markup differences in France than elsewhere is also consistent with the estimates in Table 4, 
which showed that cost differences between diesel and gasoline cars do not vary significantly 
25The standard error is  obtained by first  linearizing the expression for  the estimated markup fraction 
around the parameter estimates, and then applying the standard formula for computing the standard error 
of linear transformations of random variables. 
24 across markets.  In this case, then the larger diesel price premium in France than in Belgium 
and Italy (see Table 2)  must naturally follow from higher diesel markups. 
To further verify the plausibility of the results on the relative importance of cost versus 
markup differences, it would be instructive to have some prior information on cost differences. 
Unfortunately,  no direct information was at our disposal.  As an alternative, we  collected 
data on the wholesale prices for  a sample of gasoline and diesel  engines, as charged to the 
dealers when old or broken engines need replacement.  We compare the differences between 
the diesel and gasoline engine prices with the respective car price differences.26  Engine price 
differentials may be a reasonable proxy for differences in the cost of producing gasoline and 
diesel  cars,  provided that the manufacturers do not also use the wholesale prices to price 
discriminate. Interestingly, we find that the average engine price differential over the sample 
of car makes is 586 dollar, compared to a much larger average car price differential of 1567 
dollar, even though the cars differ in nothing else than the engine.27  This confirms that the 
empirical results that price differentials are to a large extent driven by markup differentials. 
6.4  Implications for tax incidence 
Further insights in how consumers and manufacturers behave in response to taxes is obtained 
from computing various elasticities of demand with respect to tax changes.  We consider the 
effects of both changes in fuel taxes and changes in annual car taxes on the market share 
of gasoline cars in the total sales of a  make j.  We concentrate on conditional effects,  i.e. 
conditional on the consumers' choice of a given car make.  A more complete analysis of tax 
26The engine price data were collected directly from Belgian dealers in 2001, for the models in our original 
data set, or for their successors in case the models no longer were sold.  For a consistent comparison, we also 
collected the corresponding car price data for this sample of models. 
27More precisely,  for  the sample of models in Belgium/2001 the average gasoline engine price was 4118 
dollar, compared to an average diesel engine price of 4704.  The average gasoline car price was 18581 dollar, 
versus an average diesel car price of 20149.  The car price data are of a comparable order of magnitude as 
the Belgian car price data during 1991-1994 (see Table 2), while the characteristics data were also compa,. 
rable (average gasoline displacement of 1626cc versus average diesel displacement of 1928; average gasoline 
horsepower of 75.86kW versus average diesel horsepower of 67.89kW) 
25 effects would also look at substitution towards different  car makes,  or to other modes of 
transportation.  Such an a...lalysis  would be very interesting for  policy,  yet it is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  It would require a  more detailed analysis of the market, with specific 
assumptions on product differentiation between cars (Vj, e.g.  specified as in Berry, Levinsohn 
and Pakes (1995)) and on competition between firms. 
There are several ways to present the tax elasticities.  For example, one may look at the 
separate demand effects of increasing the annual car tax for gasoline and for diesel cars.  To 
summarize the information, we  decided to "average"  these effects:  we  focus  on the effects 
of increasing the fuel  and car tax differentials.  More specifically, we compute the effect on 
the market share of gasoline cars in the total sales of make j, when the gasoline fuel tax is 
increased by 0.5 percent and the diesel car tax is reduced by 0.5 percent; and similarly for 
the gasoline and diesel car taxes.  The computed elasticities per make j  are: 
cF 
J 
~  dSGlj .!l£. _ ~  dSGlj .!l.!!.-
2  dqG  sGlj  2  dqD  sGfj 
~  dSGlj  TjG  _  ~  dSGlj TjD 
2 dTjG sGlj  2 dTjD sGlj' 
The term cf reads as the elasticity of the demand for  car j's gasoline powered variant with 
respect to the fuel tax differential; cf  is the elasticity of the demand for  car j's gasoline 
powered variant with respect to the car tax differential. 
We compute both partial and full tax elasticities.  The partial tax elasticities are those 
one traditionally obtains from estimating demand equations, i.e.  they account for the effects 
of taxes on demand,  holding all other things constant.  The full  tax elasticities take into 
account simultaneous changes in the manufacturers' prices.  Our previous estimates favored 
a  specification in which there is  tax incidence in the following  sense:  the manufacturers 
respond to a more favorable diesel tax treatment by raising their markups (and vice versa). 
But it is not yet clear to which extent this tax incidence is driven by fuel taxes or by car 
taxes.  A comparison between the various partial and full tax elasticities can shed light on 
this question. 
Before presenting the estimates, two caveats are in order.  First, recall that the empirical 
26 model assumed that consumers have an inelastic demand for mileage.  The estimated elas-
ticities thus do not take into account changes in driving habits. If an elastic mileage demand 
would be assumed, our estimated elasticities may change.  Nevertheless, the empirical liter-
ature referred to in the introduction has obtained small elasticity estimates for the demand 
for mileage (conditional upon car purchase), ranging between 0 and 0.2.  Our results would 
thus essentially remain robust.  Second, the model assumes that the product characteristics 
remain unchanged. In the long run, firms may invest in modifying their products in response 
to fuel price changes.  Pakes et al.  (1993) show that companies started to introduce new cars 
in the U.S. after the increased fuel prices in the 70s;  the development of reliable diesel cars 
in Europe during the 70s and 80s has a similar interpretation. Yet note that the European 
countries currently set the fuel and car taxes in an uncoordinated way (unlike VAT); a na-
tional tax reform may therefore only have a modest impact on the product characteristics. 
Even if  product characteristics would be modified in the long run, this would alter the level 
of the elasticities, yet our main conclusion that one should account for the mitigating effects 
of tax incidence (price responses) would remain. 
Table 7 presents the estimates. We focus the presentation on the estimated elasticity of a 
representative car (with average characteristics). The standard error is computed numerically 
using the same procedure described in the previous subsection. First, consider the estimated 
partial elasticities,  ignoring tax incidence.  Looking at a  representative car for  the three 
countries, one can see that increasing the fuel tax differential has a  much larger effect  on 
demand than increasing the car tax differential (elasticity of -2.78 compared to -.597).  This 
is because the annual car taxes are much lower in absolute value than the annual fuel costs 
(expenditure share of less than 25 percent), so a percentage increase in car taxes has a smaller 
effect on the consumer's budget constraint than a percentage increase in fuel costs.  The high 
fuel tax elasticity is consistent with the high long-term fuel price elasticities obtained in the 
transportation and energy literature, as discussed in the introduction.  Notice that Italy has 
much lower fuel and car tax elasticities for  its representative car, as compared to the other 
two countries. This follows from the high market share of the representative gasoline car in 
Italy, caused by the disfavorable diesel tax treatment. 
27 Now consider the estimated full elasticities, which take into account the manufacturers' 
tax incidence.  This shows  a quae different picture.  The car tax and especially the fuel 
tax elasticity are now substantially lower than when tax incidence is  ignored.  The manu-
facturers absorb an important part of an increase in the tax differential by lowering their 
price differential.  The drop in the elasticities follows from our earlier obtained finding that 
markups explain an important part of the price differences between gasoline and diesel cars. 
An interesting new finding also emerges from our estimates: the fuel tax elasticities drop by 
more than the car tax elasticities when tax incidence is taken into account.  This shows that 
most of the tax incidence is based on the fuel taxes and less so on the car taxes.  This is also 
consistent with the reduced form findings in Table 3,  which showed that car taxes have a 
lower impact on manufacturer's price differentials than fuel taxes.  Economically speaking, 
fuel taxes provide the main basis for  price diSCrimination,  allowing the manufacturers to 
exploit consumers' mileage heterogeneity.  Notice that the drop in tax elasticities is  most 
pronounced for  France:  this is the country with the most favorable tax treatment and the 
largest resulting markup differences between gasoline and diesel cars. 
The estimates of the elasticities have implications for tax policy.  We illustrate this using 
two examples. 
Effectiveness of tax policy 
In designing a  public policy towards cars, the U.S.  and Europe have followed  a quite 
different approach.  The U.S.  have put most emphasis on direct regulation of the car pur-
chasing decision.  This has been implemented for example through fuel efficiency standards 
(the CAFE standard), through purchasing mandates for fleet owners, and through mandated 
changes in auto and fuel  availability.  In Europe, car and fuel  taxes have been used more 
commonly as an instrument to direct the demand towards a specific type of cars.  The dif-
ferential gasoline and diesel tax policy is  not the only example of this approach.  Another 
example is the substantial tax discrimination between leaded and unleaded gasoline cars to 
promote the purchase of unleaded cars.  In the near future,  the introduction of electrical 
cars may again raise the tax question.  At first sight, our high estimates of the partial elas-
ticities indicate that a tax policy can be a quite effective policy instrument.  This is  also 
28 suggested by the high long-term fuel  price elasticities in the transportation/energy litera-
ture,  ''!.TId  Borenstein's (1993)  finding for  U.S.  data on leaded and nnleaded gasoline cars. 
However, our results on the full elasticities demonstrate that it is important to properly take 
into account the manufacturers' pricing responses when evaluating the effect of a change in 
taxes on demand.  In the case of gasoline and diesel  fuel  taxes,  a  proper account for  tax 
incidence may substantially reduce the estimated effectiveness of a tax policy. 
Revenue implications of reducing tax discrimination 
A central theme in the European policy debate is whether the current system of tax dis-
crimination should be maintained.  From an environmental point of view,  there are several 
opponents against the tax discrimination because of the adverse effects of the diesel fuel (see 
Section 2).  From a distributional point of view, specific consumer interest groups have (un-
successfully) taken action to reduce the discrimination in car taxes, based on constitutional 
arguments.  Whatever the possible policy objectives behind the recent political pressure to 
reduce tax discrimination, one may ask what would be the budgetary implications for  the 
governments. If  there were only one good to be taxed, this question would be easily addressed 
by looking at the tax elasticities:  after a tax increase revenues would increase if and only if 
the elasticity (in absolute value) were less than one.  In our application there are two goods, 
gasoline and diesel cars, which may be taxed either directly, through the annual car tax, or 
indirectly, through the fuel taxes. In this case, the tax elasticities are again important, but 
one should also account for the fact that a loss of consumers for  one good implies a gain in 
consumers for the other good.28 
Consider for example an increase in the diesel car tax by 1 unit.  On the one hand, this 
directly raises tax revenues proportional to the market share of diesel cars.  On the other 
hand, this induces substitution from  diesel  cars to gasoline cars.  The magnitude of this 
substitution effect is proportional to the difference in tax revenues from gasoline and diesel 
cars, as paid by the indifferent consumer.  If the indifferent consumer would pay a higher 
amount of car plus fuel taxes on a gasoline than on a diesel car, then the substitution effect is 
28We  maintain the approach of looking at susbtitution between gasoline and diesel cars, conditional on 
the choice of a specific make. 
29 positive and reinforces the direct effect on revenues.  If, in contrast, the indifferent consumer 
would pay a lower amount of car and fuel taxes on a gasoline car, then the substitution effect 
is negative and may even outweigh the direct revenue effect. 
Table 8 presents the revenue effects of various tax experiments for  a representative car 
make, expressed in elasticity form.29  To interpret the results, notice first that in all three 
countries the indifferent consumer of the representative car would pay higher taxes if she 
would choose the gasoline engine instead of the diesel engine.  When purchasing a gasoline 
engine,  her extra annual tax payment (fuel taxes plus car tax) would  amount to $282  in 
Belgium, $378 in France and $155  in Italy.  Our previous discussion thus implies that the 
revenue effects from raising the diesel taxes (fuel or car taxes) will necessarily be positive 
(since it induces revenue-raising substitution to gasoline cars), while the revenue effects from 
raising gasoline taxes are ambiguous. 
First, consider the effects of raising the diesel taxes (the second and fourth columns of 
Table 8). In Belgium and France, the revenue effect of raising the diesel fuel taxes are quite 
substantial, with elasticities of respectively .62  and and 1.00 if one ignores tax incidence; 
and elasticities of .44 and .61 if one takes tax incidence into account. The revenue effects of 
raising the diesel car taxes are smaller (e.g.,  .25 and .13 if one accounts for tax incidence), 
but this follows  from  the relatively small revenue share of car taxes relative to fuel taxes 
(less than 25 percent).  In Italy, the revenue effects of fuel  and car taxes are much smaller 
than in Belgium or France, for two reasons:  (i) the lower substitution effects found in Table 
7,  and (ii) the lower extra amount of taxes paid by the indifferent gasoline consumer, which 
reduces the budgetary impact arising from the substitution effect. 
Now consider the revenue effects of raising gasoline taxes (the first and third columns 
in Table 8).  As  expected,  the effects  are no longer necessarily positive.  In Belgium and 
especially in France, a raise in the gasoline fuel tax would reduce tax revenues if tax incidence 
29More  specifically,  to  evaluate  the  revenue  effects  of  the  gasoline  car  tax,  we  compute 
(dRj/dTjG)/(TjG/(Rj), where Rj is  the total tax revenue on car make j.  This expression thus measures 
the effect of a 1 percent car tax increase on car j's total tax revenues (conditional on the purchase of car j). 
Analogous formulas apply for the other tax effects. 
30 is ignored.  However,  a raise in the gasoline fuel tax would still (moderately) increase tax 
revenues, if one takes into account that the manufacturers will respond by lowering the price 
of gasoline cars.  Indeed, if one accounts for tax incidence, the estimated substitution effect 
towards diesel cars, which is  bad for  revenues,  is  much lower  (see  Table 7).  In Italy,  the 
revenue effects  of a  raise in the gasoline fuel  tax are positive and strong, also due to the 
weak substitution effects  found  in Table 7.  Finally,  the revenue  effects  of a  raise in  the 
gasoline car taxes are small in all countries. This largely follows from the small share of car 
taxes in total revenue. 
To illustrate how to use these numbers in practice, consider a policy to reduce the fuel tax 
discrimination by raising the diesel fuel  tax.  As discussed, this policy has been advocated 
by many in the European policy debate, motivated by environmental and/or distributional 
considerations.  Table 8 implies that such a policy would not contradict with government 
budgetary restrictions; it would rather soften the government's budget constraint. Especially 
in Belgium and in France the tax revenues would increase quite substantially.  Put differ-
ently, the current favorable tax treatment on the diesel fuel in Europe is hard to defend on 
budgetary considerations.  Since distributional or environmental goals would also favor  an 
increase in the diesel fuel tax, other objectives, such as subsidization of the transportation 
sector, should explain the current tax system. 
7  Conclusion 
The existing tax policies  towards gasoline and diesel  cars in European countries  provide 
a  unique opportunity to analyze quality-based price  discrimination  and the implied tax 
incidence. We have developed an econometric framework of demand and pricing for gasoline 
and diesel cars.  Consumers make a decision to buy a gasoline or a diesel car based on their 
annual mileage.  Manufacturers set gasoline and diesel car prices with the possible aim of 
discriminating between consumers with a high willingnes to pay for savings in mileage costs, 
and those with a low willingness to pay. 
Our empirical results showed that the relative pricing of gasoline and diesel cars is  con-
31 sistent with price discrimination of a monopolistic type, and inconsistent with competitive 
price differentials.  On average,  about 75  to 90  percent of the price  differentials between 
gasoline and diesel cars can be explained by markup differences.  The substantial degree 
of quality-based, second-degree price discrimination may seem surprising in a market with 
many car manufacturers. It  adds to the well documented evidence of geographically oriented, 
third-degree price discrimination in the European car markets. 
The implied tax incidence is  especially based on fuel  taxes and less  so on annual car 
taxes.  This result has important implications for measuring the demand effects of increases 
in the fuel tax differentials between gasoline and diesel cars.  IT one accounts for the presence 
of tax incidence, the estimated effectiveness of a change in fuel taxes drops considerably, by 
more than 50 percent.  An increase in diesel fuel  and car taxes would unambiguously raise 
government revenues, whereas an increase in gasoline taxes may have ambiguous effects. 
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35 9  Tables 
TablelA. Summary statistics (406 observations) 
gasoline cars  diesel cars 
Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
horsepower (k  W)  65.88  20.94  59.08  17.29 
displacement (cc)  1605  323  1963  342 
weight (kg)  1061  203  1143  206 
speed (km/hour)  177.7  17.9  169.6  16.4 
acceleration (sec.  to 100 km/h)  113.24  1 2.44  15.21  12.50 
fuel efficiency (liter per 100 km)  7.56  1.05  6.05  .76 
French origin  0.160  0.367  - -
German origin  *  0.431  0.496  - -
Italian origin  0.305  0.461  - -
initial purchase price (in $)  18093  7061  20417  8063 
fuel price (in $ per liter)  .931  .109  .712  .086 
annual car tax (in $)  173.7  78.7  285.9  236.5 
sales  19033  35885  9399  14689 
* Includes G.M.  (Opel) and Ford cars produced in Germany. 
36 TablelB. Summary statistics, diesel- gasoline' (406 observations) 
Mean  Std Dev" 
Overall  Between  Within 
~  horsepower (kW)  -6.80  7.36  7.29  1.84 
~  displacement (cc)  357  243  240  36 
~  weight (kg)  82  34  32  12 
~  speed (km/hour)  -7.11  6.75  6.58  1.84 
~  acceleration (sec.  to 100 km/h)  -1.95  1.57  1.54  .32 
~  fuel efficiency (liter per 100 kID)  1-1.50  1.67  .65  1·12 
~  initial purchase price (in $)  2323  1632  1466  683 
~  fuel price (in $ per liter)  -.218  .051  .0lD  .050 
~  annual car tax (in $)  112.2  235.2  72.7  225.5 
diesel sales/total sales  .419  .223  .144  .171 
* Variables refer to absolute differences between the diesel and gasoline variables, except for sales, which 
refers to a percentage (comfonn with the model specification). 
**  The standard deviation is computed on the mean of the variables across time, say Xjm, where j 
indexes the car make and m  indexes the market.  The standard deviation of Xjm is  decomposed into a 
between component (Xj - x) and a within (Xjm - Xj) component. 
37 Table 2.  Prices and taxes by country 
(in $)  I  gasoline cars I  diesel cars I  difference 
A verage annual fuel  costs,  including fuel taxes' 
Belgium  1130  739  -391 
France  1188  679  -509 
Italy  1090  670  -420 
A verage annual car taxes 
Belgium 1218  284  66 
France  1126  86  -40 
Italy  1182  675  493 
Average initial purchase price 
Belgium  17455  19585  2130 
France  18216  20950  2734 
Italy  19072  20973  1901 
Diesel sales  (in percent) 
Belgium  0.442 
France  0.537 
Italy  0.152 
38 Table 3. Reduced form regressions 
OLB esUmates 
constant  -2154.7  -3344.7 
(408.1)  (797.5) 
French market  -88.2  -333.0 
(223.6)  (223.6) 
Italian market  -1268.6  -2020.9 
(532.6)  (552.5) 
French origin  38.5  -41.7 
(290.1)  (283.1) 
German origin  459.1  36404 
(256.7)  (251.2) 
Italian origin  362.8  297.1 
(261.1)  (254.9) 
horsepower  22.06  30.18 
(9.87)  (9.76) 
displacement  2.78  2.62 
(AI)  (040) 
weight  8.01  6043 
(2.08)  (2.05) 
fuel cost  -6.34  -15.05 
(.73)  (3.29) 
fuel cost*fuel cost  -.011 
(.003) 
car tax  .56  -3.09 
(1.17)  (lAO) 
car tax*car tax  .0lD 
(.002) 
R2  .344  .382 
39 • Annual fuel costs are computed for the average driver by model. 
Table 4.  Estimates of (7) and (9) 
demand parameters 
demand only  demand + pricing jointly 
monopolistic  competitive 
constant  -325.9  -308.5  -279.2 
(62.1)  1(72,3)  (79.5) 
French market  -49.8  -50.4  3.6 
(26.7)  (31.5)  (34.0) 
Italian market  152.3  146.5  74.4 
(41.6)  (47.7)  (52.0) 
French origin  43.0  50.9  96.1 
(36.9)  (42.4)  (46.8) 
German origin  37.6  44.0  103.2 
(35.7)  (40.7)  (44.3) 
Italian origin  60.0  65.9  136.7 
(32.8)  (38.0)  (41.5) 
horsepower  1.86  1.80  .57 
(1.74)  (2.05)  (2.29) 
displacement  .426  .420  .621 
(093)  (.111)  (.121) 
weight  .845  .879  1.602 
(.386)  (.439)  (.471) 
p  .121  .132  .250 
(.021)  (.022)  (.012) 
(Table 4 continued on next page.) 
40 Table 4.  (Continued) 
I demand + pricing jointly 
monopolistic  competitive 
cost parameters 
constant  -1526.2  346.6 
(513.1)  (379.5) 
French market  -13.1  535.2 
(235.5)  (179.1) 
Italian market 1-232.4  -914.7 
(273.6)  (239.7) 
French origin  -355.2  426.6 
(433.6)  (242.9) 
German origin  343.7  554.9 
(258.7)  (227.9) 
Italian origin  265.4  550.2 
(273.6)  (223.0) 
horsepower  24.0  -9.6 
(12.8)  (10.7) 
displacement  2.83  1.15 
(.66)  (.56) 
weight  7.90  6.60 
(3.14)  (2.27) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
41 Table 5. Actual mileages and mileages predicted by demand model (7) 
Weight  Average annual mileages 
Category  Gasoline Consumers  Diesel Consumers 
(in kg)  Predicted  Std Dev  Actual  Predicted  Std Dev  Actual 
650-750  12980"  524  13501  22497'  1669  25471 
750-850  12771"  654  13583  20807'  1322  22217 
850-950  12959  598  15019  20923'  1077  22984 
950-1050  14331'  527  15101  25474"  1414  23667 
1050-1150  12968  1178  15667  21144'  1420  23295 
1150-1250  15052'  749  15344  24184"  1320  25038 
• An asterix denotes cases where the actual value falls within the 95 percent confidence interval of the 
predicted value. 
Table 6. Fraction of price differences explained by markups 
Mean  Std Dev  Representative Model 
estimate I  st. error 
all countries  .840  .474  .612  .112 
Belgium  .807  .487  .564  .124 
France  .894  .372  .873  .132 
Italy  .784  .627  .512  .112 
42 Table 7.  Elasticities of demand with respect to taxes 
I  Fuel taxes  I  Car taxes 
estimate* 1  st. err.  estimate* I st. err. 
Ignoring tax incidence 
all countries  -2.783  (.260)  -.597  (.086) 
Belgium  -3.103  (.305)  -.736  (.111) 
France  -3.964  (.287)  -.569  (.084) 
Italy  -.404  (.049)  -.091  (.014) 
I  Accounting for tax incidence 
all countries  -1.218  (.016)  -.465  (.048) 
Belgium  -1.412  (.004)  -.583  (.064) 
France  -.225  (.029)  -.280  (.084) 
Italy  -.323  (.036)  -.090  (.013) 
* The elasticity estimates are for a representative model. 
Table 8.  Revenue effects of various taxes* 
Fuel taxes  Car taxes 
gasoline I  diesel  gasoline I  diesel 
Ignoring tax incidence 
all countries  -.109  .627  .026  .272 
Belgium  -.109  .618  .033  .287 
France  -.518  .996  -.067  .178 
Italy  .702  .073  .174  .045 
Accounting for tax incidence 
all countries  .213  .444  .048  .236 
Belgium  .191  .437  .060  .250 
France  .224  .607  -.001  .130 
Italy  .713  .067  .174  .045 
* Elasticities for a representative model. 
43 